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Özlem Denli: I will write an essay on your theory of global justice. 
In addition, we worked on the following questions. (1) Is it fair to ar-
gue that there is a culturalist tendency in political philosophy empha-
sizing cultural pluralism and specificity, and concepts such as toler-
ance and recognition, which accompanies the process of globalization? 
In your opinion, what is the meaning of cosmopolitanism? 
 
Thomas Pogge: Yes, this culturalist tendency is certainly there, 
growing out of a concern to protect and preserve the many cultures, 
languages, religions, world views and ways of life extant on this 
planet. Instead of a global melting pot or monoculture, which would 
most likely be dominated by Western-style consumerism, we – and 
this includes many Westerners – would rather live in a culturally di-
verse world that would offer people genuine alternatives in regard to 
their local community and lifestyle.   
‘Cosmopolitanism’ denotes in the first instance support for the 
idea of a single global society, something like Kant’s world republic. 
Cosmopolitans in this legal or political sense are advocates for a 
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world state. But in philosophy another meaning has established itself. 
Here cosmopolitanism is the idea that the whole human world should 
be shaped in light of the equally weighted needs and interests of all 
human beings – and not through the usual bargaining that gives some 
nations, firms and persons vastly disproportional influence. Given 
certain empirical facts or assumptions, this philosophical cosmopoli-
tanism may lead to the endorsement of legal or political cosmopoli-
tanism. But it does not have to. Thus one might argue that people’s 
need for cultural diversity is best met in a world in which reasonably 
autonomous territorial states continue to play a major role.     
 
Özlem Denli: (2) Is Rawls a culturalist thinker in his later work, 
especially “the Law of Peoples”? How do you relate your work to 
Rawls’s early and late theorizing? 
 
Thomas Pogge: Rawls is expressing support for the idea that non-
liberal ways of organizing national societies should be tolerated and 
respected, in particular such “decent hierarchical societies” as his in-
famous Kazanistan. But, in fact, his respect for such societies is bare-
ly skin-deep as Rawls also expressed the strong hope that these so-
cieties will reform themselves into liberal ones. His main reason for 
tolerating decent societies seems to be that this is the best way of fa-
cilitating their self-reform: that any show of disrespect or pressure 
would be counter-productive. 
Rawls’s early work, pulled together in A Theory of Justice, taught 
us to focus moral attention, first and foremost, upon a social system’s 
basic structure: its central organizing institutional arrangements. This 
topic is of crucial importance not merely at the level of the nation 
state but, with the rapid emergence of a highly influential global in-
stitutional architecture after the end of the Cold War, also at the su-
pranational and global levels (for example, in regard to the formation 
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of the European Union and the World Trade Organization). But, 
amazingly, Rawls misses this crucial topic of global institutional de-
sign even while historical events during the 1990s were bringing it to 
social prominence. The eight laws of peoples he proclaims seem to 
endorse a kind of libertarianism at the global level, approving any in-
ternational institutional arrangements that states may have agreed 
upon (“Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings”). Such ap-
proval is problematic, given that expertise and bargaining power 
among states in our world are, and in a Rawlsian world would con-
tinue to be, very unequally distributed, resulting in a skewed interna-
tional order that leads to ever escalating economic, social and politi-
cal inequalities. It is true that Rawls calls for a “fair background 
framework” governing international relations and speaks out against 
“unjustified distributive effects” of supranational cooperative organi-
zation. But because he does not provide, and explicitly rejects, any 
conception of social justice focused on the global institutional order, 
his theory lacks any basis on which one might judge a given back-
ground framework to be fair or unfair, or given distributive effects 
justified or unjustified. 
 
Özlem Denli: (3) Is global justice an institutional matter alone? 
What is the role of virtue, conscience and sense of justice in dealing 
with global hunger and poverty? Can you name some basic values 
and principles that ground or support your critique and reform pro-
posals regarding global justice? 
 
Thomas Pogge: Global justice cannot be a solely institutional mat-
ter because social institutions – the rules, practices and procedures 
that structure and organize the common life of human beings – must 
be put in place, preserved or revised, interpreted, applied and en-
forced by living human beings. For this reason, an institutional order 
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can be just for any length of time only when it enjoys the intelligent 
and morally motivated allegiance of citizens and public officials. 
Here the key virtue is one of role-differentiated anti-nepotism. Public 
officials must be committed to the idea that, when they act in their 
capacity as officials, they must completely set aside their personal at-
tachments for the sake of practicing perfect impartiality. They are not 
merely asked to give more weight to their allegiance to society than 
to their allegiance to their family and friends (which would be re-
markable enough!). Rather, they are asked to give no special weight 
at all to the needs and interests of their loved ones.  
On reflection, this is quite a surprising element of ordinary moral 
thinking. Human beings form very close bonds with one another: the 
bond between a parent and her child, for example. And it is very nat-
ural, then, for people who stand in such a very close relationship to 
give it much special weight: for a mother, say, greatly to prioritize 
her child over other people to whom she has a much slighter attach-
ment or none at all. To be sure, the special weight a mother may give 
to the needs and interests of her child is not unlimited; but it is never-
theless quite substantial. It is all the more remarkable, then, that ordi-
nary morality strictly limits the scope of any such partiality: there are 
certain contexts in which she may give even quite important interests 
of her child no special weight at all. When she makes decisions as 
principal of a high school, for instance, it would be wrong of her to 
give greater weight to her own child’s interest in good grades than to 
the analogous interest of other pupils. The same is true when she holds 
a public office that involves the awarding of government contracts. 
The same is true even when she merely exercises the office of citi-
zen, when she weighs in, for instance, on the question whether and 
how affirmative action should be continued in her country. In this 
context it would again be unfair of her if she based her public state-
ments on private reasoning such as the following: “I love my chil-
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dren and, if they were girls or black, I would of course speak up in 
support of affirmative action. But in fact my kids are both white boys 
who would be taxed to fund an affirmative action effort that would 
also erode their competitive advantage over girls and non-white kids. 
For the sake of my children, I will therefore use my political voice in 
opposition to affirmative action programs.” Even opponents of af-
firmative action would find such reasoning morally deficient: it is 
widely agreed that, in their public pronouncements and electoral de-
cisions about matters of legislation and institutional design, citizens 
ought to set aside their private commitments and loyalties to focus 
exclusively on social justice and the national good. 
To be sure, this sort of impartiality of citizens and public officials 
is not fully achieved in any society today. But it is widely enough 
shared as an ideal in the more advanced societies to afford substantial 
protections to the weak and vulnerable. Poverty and hunger could not 
continue if an analogous impartiality requirement were recognized 
on the global level in regard to the design and application of global 
institutional arrangements. This is my hope for moral progress: that 
there will come a time when those who participate in the formulation 
or implementation of global rules, practices or procedures will, in 
this capacity, set aside not merely their allegiance to their family and 
friends, but also their allegiance to their home country, and will sin-
gle-mindedly aim for just institutional arrangements, that is, institu-
tional arrangements whose design can be justified by reference to the 
equally weighted needs and interests of all human beings worldwide. 
In a world in which most supranational officials are cosmopolitans in 
this sense and in which such cosmopolitanism is demanded of them 
by citizens worldwide – in such a world serious deprivations would 
not be hard to avoid.  
Human rights are meant to formulate and to protect the most im-
portant needs and interests of human beings, and the central aim of 
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supranational institutional design should then be the full realization 
of human rights worldwide. To be sure, human rights do not exhaust 
justice and justice does not exhaust what is important, nor even what 
is morally important. Still, the appeal to human rights suffices to 
ground my critique of the global status quo and my institutional re-
form proposals. 
Humanity has the capacity to establish and maintain and a global 
institutional order that would fully realize human rights. Yet human 
rights are still massively under fulfilled around the globe. It is our re-
sponsibility, the responsibility of the more privileged citizens around 
the world, to conceive and to implement suitable institutional re-
forms that would advance the global realization of human rights. 
 
Özlem Denli: (4) In your theorizing and reform proposals you deal 
with negative duties as a less controversial moral ground compared 
to positive duties. How does this emphasis affect the empirical side 
of your argument, and what challenges have you encountered? 
 
Thomas Pogge: I have sought to show that the more privileged citi-
zens in the more affluent countries are, though their governments ac-
tively involved in human rights violations insofar as these govern-
ments design and impose a global institutional order that foreseeable 
and avoidably reproduce massive human rights deficits in the so-called 
less developed countries. People have opposed my thesis by claiming 
that those human rights deficits have other, more local causes. Against 
this, I have tried to show that these relevant local causes are often 
themselves causally dependent on supranational institutional factors or 
working in tandem with them. These empirical matters are certainly 
complex and difficult; and it is my hope that the controversies my 
work has triggered will motivate more solid social science research in-
to the causal effects of particular supranational institutional features 
137 
and how these effects interact with the effects of other relevant causal 
factors (national climate, geography, natural resource endowment, cul-
ture, religion, political system, colonial history, etc.).    
 
Özlem Denli: (5) What kind of institutional structures can be used 
to implement your idea of a global resource dividend? 
 
Thomas Pogge: The Global Resources Dividend (GRD) has two 
sides: collection and disbursement. On the collection side, there are 
three elements. First, we need to formulate rules about what coun-
tries are to be charged for and how much. Here the idea is to discour-
age natural resource uses that are especially harmful, for example by 
causing environmental degradation or climate change or by depriving 
future generations of their fair share. Second, we need to put in place 
an assessment system that monitors how much crude oil is being ex-
tracted in Nigeria or how much CO2 is being released in Indonesia. 
Although the GRD is collected from countries, its cost will be passed 
on, typically via companies, to end-users of scarce natural resources 
and to the consumers whose purchases and consumption sustain 
greenhouse gas emissions and pollution. Third, we also need to cre-
ate a system of sanctions maintained by compliant countries against 
non-compliers. The former are required to put special tariffs on im-
ports from and exports to non-complying countries in order thus to 
collect the GRD payments upon which the latter have defaulted. 
On the disbursement side, there are two essential elements. First, 
we need to formulate rules for how the GRD revenues are to be spent 
effectively toward the full realization of human rights. These rules 
should be highly flexible in regard to channels, encouraging the use 
of any conduits – international agencies, national governments, prov-
inces, municipalities, NGOs, associations, unions, individuals, etc. – 
that can make funds effective toward their purpose of realizing hu-
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man rights. Second, we need an administrative staff that makes 
spending decisions pursuant to these rules. 
The entire GRD system must be continuously evaluated and peri-
odically adjusted in light to the experience gathered. This evaluation 
should also observe and learn from other relevant national and inter-
national schemes (“best practices”).   
 
Özlem Denli: (6) At the expense of oversimplification it can be ar-
gued that the primary addressee of your reformist vision is the influ-
ential actors in affluent countries. What can be the role of masses in 
poor countries? What political mechanisms and processes can sup-
plement the attempts for institutional reform? 
 
Thomas Pogge: Citizens of poor countries certainly can, and in-
creasingly do, play a significant role in the reform of their own society 
as well as in pressuring their government to do a better job in repre-
senting the interests of the majority of their compatriots international-
ly. There are great gains waiting to be made in regard to the latter task 
especially. Some large developing countries – China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Argentina – have become quite in-
fluential in international negotiations, and these countries now consti-
tute a substantial counterweight to the US, EU and Japan in interna-
tional negotiations. But ordinary citizens in these countries typically 
have very little understanding of how, and how strongly, international 
institutional arrangements affect their interests. The foreign policies 
and negotiating stances of the most powerful developing countries are 
therefore typically heavily influenced by their economic elites: the 
owners and managers of the major export and import companies, es-
pecially. Here collective learning and mobilization could make a tre-
mendous difference by preventing the political leaders of the less de-
veloped countries from selling out the interests of their underprivi-
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leged compatriots.  
There is much else that the masses in the less developed countries 
can do to promote their own emancipation. They can form unions 
and other associations to defend their rights and interests collective-
ly. They can maintain mass media and blogs to provide news and in-
terpretation alternative to the establishment views. They can advo-
cate and practice solidarity with poor people in their own society and 
in other less developed countries. They can influence the conduct of 
corporations through consumer boycotts and other collective actions. 
And they can, through their own conduct; help eradicate reactionary 
and discriminatory practices that disadvantage women, people of 
color, gays, untouchables, or members of certain religions, for exam-
ple. I have not written about such matters in detail not because I 
deem them less important but because I lack the knowledge and 
standing to contribute meaningfully to such national and regional 
discourses. I am much better equipped to think and write about the 
responsibilities of people like myself, reasonably privileged citizens 
of the more affluent countries. 
 
Özlem Denli: (7) In your recent work, you deal with climate 
change and global warming as an issue relevant to global justice con-
cerns. Can you elaborate? 
 
Thomas Pogge: This initiative originated in a conversation with 
Jaap Spier, Advocate General of the Netherlands. Noting that more 
than 20 years had been wasted without any progress against climate 
change, we were wondering what political levers were left to compel 
governments finally to act toward saving our planet. We concluded 
that only one avenue had not yet been tried: encouraging courts to 
compel governments to curb greenhouse gas emissions. 
There is, of course, the common view that governments have no 
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legal duties to do anything about greenhouse gas emissions unless 
and until they explicitly impose such legal duties on themselves – 
something they have recently failed to do one more time in Paris. But 
in view of the very serious harm greenhouse gas emissions are in-
flicting and will inflict on millions of human beings, the soundness 
of this view is, to say the least, not obvious. There is, after all, a lot 
of law that bears on the issue of inflicting harm: human rights law, 
international law, tort law, private law and environmental law – to 
mention just the most obvious. And does it really make sense to say 
that the best overall interpretation of all this existing law is that states 
are free to emit as much greenhouse gases, and thereby kill and harm 
as many people, as they please? 
Our “Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations” (EGCO) – 
consisting of 14 eminent legal experts – has unanimously concluded 
that this makes no sense, that states have a collective duty to restrain 
their emissions in order to avoid inflicting catastrophic harm on their 
citizens, on foreigners and on people yet unborn. Using legal reason-
ing, we have tried to explore, concretely and in detail, what these le-
gally binding restraints are. This is a difficult task because these re-
straints are not explicitly laid down somewhere in black-letter law. 
To discern the relevant legal restraints, we have had to consider large 
swaths of law along with associated legal precedents and opinio juris 
and then find the best unified interpretation of them.  
This is closely analogous to what judges and jurists do in regard to 
other legal questions also. For example, a judge may be asked to de-
cide whether a particular prison is so overcrowded that it is incon-
sistent with the inmates’ human rights. There is no black letter law 
that allows the judge to derive a maximum permissible number of 
inmates. And yet it is clear that a prison can be overcrowded in hu-
man-rights-violating ways. So what is the threshold? The judge does 
not have the luxury to decline to decide, nor does she have the luxury 
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to give some vague range. She has to make a precise decision, using 
whatever legal materials are available in order to single out one most 
plausible number as the maximum number of prisoners that may be 
housed in the prison in question.    
How then can a judge reason her way to a legally sound decision 
on matters of greenhouse gas emissions? She can start with the in-
sight that states have a collective legal duty to avert climate catastro-
phe. To fulfill this collective duty, states must limit their emissions in 
the present and future years so as to achieve a high probability of 
avoiding massive harms deriving from, among other things: sea level 
rise; extreme weather events; acidification of oceans; shortages of 
food, water and oxygen; spreading disease vectors; extinction of 
plant and animal species. It is currently the very strong consensus of 
competent scientists that avoiding these disasters with high probabil-
ity requires that we keep anthropogenic warming relative to the pre-
industrial level below 2 degrees Celsius. Following this scientific 
consensus, the judge should then find that states have a collective le-
gal duty to act so that the average global surface temperature will 
never rise more than 2 degrees Celsius beyond that baseline.  
At the start of the Industrial Era, the share of Carbon Dioxide 
(CO2) in the air was about 270 parts per million. Since then, human 
activities have already raised this concentration by 50 percent to 400 
parts per million. This higher concentration leads to higher absorp-
tion of solar energy, which in turn is increasing the Earth’s average 
surface temperature by 1.6 degrees Celsius. More than half of this in-
crease has already occurred. 
Scientists tell us that, to respect the 2-degree ceiling, the abun-
dance of CO2 in the atmosphere must not be allowed to exceed 450 
parts per million and total future CO2 emissions must therefore stay 
below 800 Gigatons (Gt or billion tons or 1000000000). To meet 
their collective legal duty, states might restrain, presumably by 
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agreement, their emissions so that they reliably stay below 800 Gt. If 
such an agreement existed, and if it worked, then states would be act-
ing legally. But this is not the present situation. The course that states 
are currently on will lead to climate catastrophe. Annual CO2 emis-
sions worldwide are currently at 37 Gt and have been rising by about 
3 percent each year. If this pattern continues, the remaining budget of 
800 Gt of CO2 will be used up in 2033 and breach of the 2-degree 
ceiling will then become inevitable. Even if states reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions according to their present pledges, we will have gone 
through the remaining 800 Gt by 2040. Clearly, states collectively 
are engaged in conduct that breaches their collective legal duty to 
keep their citizens and future generations safe from extremely de-
structive climate change. 
But how does this collective legal duty on the set of all states 
translate into specific legal default duties for particular states at par-
ticular times? This question is tricky because, on the face of it, each 
state can say that its present greenhouse gas emissions are fully con-
sistent with respecting the 2-degree ceiling. Even if my state releases 
enormously large emissions this year, this is not inconsistent with 
averting climate catastrophe because it is always possible that other 
states, or my own state in the future, reduce emissions steeply 
enough for the 800 Gt budget to be respected. By this logic, the legal 
duty of states restrains only when it is already too late: from the mo-
ment when the collective constraint is actually being breached, in 
2033 or whenever the 800 Gt budget will be exhausted. We EGCO 
members argue, however, that some states are acting illegally today 
by acting in ways that run an unreasonably great risk of climate ca-
tastrophe – that a state cannot justify its own excessive emissions by 
expressing the unfounded hope that other states or its own future self 
will behave better than it is behaving now.  
What is implicit in these thoughts is a legally sound position on the 
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most reasonable allocation of the remaining 800 Gt of CO2 – both 
over states and also over future years. Only with such an allocation 
can we judge – here and now – that a specific state’s emissions right 
now are greater than the law allows.  
How do we derive this allocation in a legally sound way? In the 
time axis, we simply calculate a glide path, defined by a constant 
percentage decline over time – a glide path that would reliably re-
spect the 800 Gt ceiling. This glide path has a gradient of 5% per an-
num. If humanity reduces its CO2 emissions, from the current level 
of 37 Gt per annum, by 5% each year, then it will never exhaust the 
remaining 800 Gt. Our annual net CO2 emissions would be 17 Gt in 
2030, 6Gt in 2050, and 0.45 Gt in 2100. 
The next question is how these permissible annual emissions are to 
be allocated among countries. Here politics tends toward a 
contractarian allocation; every country is served according to its vul-
nerability and threat advantage. In this scenario, vulnerable Bangla-
desh would be paying Switzerland and Canada to reduce their much 
higher emissions. We argue that, by contrast, existing law is best in-
terpreted as tending toward equal per capita emissions entitlements. 
Current global CO2 emissions are 5 tons per person per year. If total 
emissions must fall by 5% annually, then per capita emissions must 
fall by 6% annually to compensate for the 1% annual increase in the 
human population. The required glide path – both for the world at 
large and also for each individual country is then one that starts from 
5 tons per person per year in 2015 and from there goes down each 
year by 6%. If all countries stick to this glide path, we have a suffi-
ciently high probability of averting a climate catastrophe. This annu-
al reduction would get average emissions down to two tons per per-
son in 2030, one ton in 2041, and one-fifth of a ton in 2067.  
EGCO has also formulated a fair allocation of our collective respon-
sibility. Here the basic idea is simply that no country can claim for it-
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self the permission to emit more per capita than can be permitted to all 
other countries. Every country must comply with the same glide path 
that humanity at large must follow. The most industrialized, high-
emission countries do not get penalized for their historical emissions 
(though these do make their duties more stringent); but they also do 
not get a break for having to implement the largest reductions.  
Most countries are currently below this common glide path, emit-
ting less than five tons of CO2 per person per year. But many rich 
countries are far above it. The European Union and China emit about 
7 tons of carbon dioxide per person per year. The US and Australia 
emit around 17 tons. And Kuwait’s emissions are at 28 tons per per-
son per year. Such countries far above the common glide path are le-
gally required to do what they can to get on track by catching up with 
the schedule of decreasing global emissions. Insofar as they cannot 
sufficiently lower their emissions right away, they must offset their 
temporarily excessive emissions by helping poor countries stay well 
below the glide path. By supporting poor countries’ transformation 
toward green energy, rich countries can offset their temporary excess 
in emissions with the result that the world as a whole complies with 
the required glide path of a 6-percent annual reduction in per capita 
CO2 emissions. 
This is just a brief thumbnail sketch of the work EGCO has done. 
We have published our full account of states’ climate duties as the 
Oslo Principles, along with a very thorough legal Commentary ex-
plaining and justifying these Principles. Both have been published 
together as a book: The Oslo Principles On Global Climate Obliga-
tions with an extensive legal Commentary, authored by Antonio Ben-
jamin, Michael Gerrard, Toon Huydecoper, Michael Kirby, M.C. 
Mehta, Qin Tianbao, Thomas Pogge, Dinah Shelton, James Silk, Jes-
sica Simor, Jaap Spier, Elisabeth Steiner, and Philip Sutherland, Ex-
pert Group on Global Climate Obligations (The Hague: Eleven Inter-
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national Publishing 2015). Both can also be freely downloaded from 
the website of my Yale Global Justice Program at 
http://globaljustice.macmillan.yale.edu/news/oslo-principles-global-
climate-change-obligations. 
The Oslo Principles show that our world’s governments can come 
together and protect our planet. If all countries tackle the problem to-
gether, then we can all live well, even as we use energy more frugal-
ly, shift our consumption away from energy-extravagant choices and 
switch from fossil to renewable energy sources. All human beings 
can have the energy they need to lead comfortable, fulfilled lives. 
The Oslo Principles present a hope for agreement on an equitable 
path toward averting our threatening climate catastrophe. 
Let me add in conclusion that the Earth’s climate is enormously 
complex, and our scientific grasp of it is continuously evolving. As we 
learn more about our planet’s climate, we may need to adjust the 
common glide path entailed by the Oslo Principles and the associated 
national obligations. States’ legal duty to avert a climate catastrophe 
does not change. But there may well be changes in what each state 
must do concretely to fulfill this duty, which is determined by the best 
scientific knowledge about its choices and their foreseeable effects.  
    
 Özlem Denli: (8) Is private property a human right? Why / why 
not? 
 
Thomas Pogge: It is very important for people to exercise a high 
degree of control over their immediate environment: the place where 
they live and the things they use day-to-day. To have such control, 
you do not need to own these things, you might rent your apartment 
and everything in it with contractual protections ensuring that others 
cannot barge in when they feel like and that you cannot be thrown 
out from one day to the next. If you have such control and protec-
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tions, then I see no human rights problem in your hypothesized ina-
bility to become the private owner of the apartment and its contents. 
The human right I would defend is then, in this regard, weaker than a 
human right to private property. 
In another sense, however, the human right I would endorse is also 
stronger. The human right to private property is usually understood 
as entitling any person to acquire things as their own if and insofar as 
this person has the money to afford or other capabilities to acquire 
them. In my view, this makes the right too weak. A poor homeless 
person, who lives without protection from criminals and the elements 
(lousy weather), isn’t helped by the – for her purely hypothetical – 
right to buy an apartment if she had the money. She has a human 
right to adequate shelter regardless of her financial situation, to at 
least a room that she can control along with a minimum supply of 
personal effects such as a bed, a chair, a table, a stove, a toothbrush, 
soap, water and so on. Having secured access to and reasonable per-
sonal control over such a minimally adequate set of items is central 
to a person’s economic, social, civil and political rights.  
